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RELATION TO US SECURITY

## SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Soviet objectives and intentions have been reappraised in this paper on the basis of a fuller analysis of the basic elements of Soviet policy. This has resulted in bringing into focus the balance that appears to exist between the two basic considerations affecting Soviet policy: (1) the strategic, i.e., the Soviet position in a global power conflict; and (2) the sociological, i.e., the use of international Communism to undermine the economic, political and social structure of the US and the rest of the non-Communist world. The effect of this balanced policy is to threaten US security on two fronts -- strategic and sociological. The USSR is presently carrying on sociological warfare against the US and the non-Communist world within the context of a traditional power rivalry which might lead to the use of military force.

The Marxist foundations of the Soviet State, however, suggest clearly that the preferred objective of Soviet policy is to achieve, through the instrument of international Communism, a Communist world under Soviet leadership rather than to conquer the world by military force. In

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terms of basic Marxist concepts, as developed by Lenin and Stalin, the USSR is using international Communism to speed up the inevitable historical development by which the capitalist world will collapse as a result of its inherent contradictions. Soviet leaders are pursuing this Marxian goal, however, in a world in which they expect capitalist states to be fully prepared to use military force either to support their imperialist aims or in an attempt to stave off collapse. Military power and strategic considerations are, therefore, essential concomitants of the sociological approach. Soviet leaders regard military power, however, first, as necessary for defense, and second, as a useful adjunct, in suitable circumstances, to their primary aggressive instrument, international Communism. Conversely, in conducting their sociological warfare, they keep clearly in mind the strategic position of the USSR in relation to a possible armed conflict and view changes in the strategic position of their adversaries, particularly the US, in the same terms.

This analysis of Soviet objectives has important implications for US defense requirements. The impact upon US resources of this two-front threat requires that choices be made between calculated risks, which in turn must be based upon the most probable assumptions that can be made with regard to Soviet intentions, methods, and objectives.

The following assumptions -- supported by detailed arguments in the text and the enclosures -- are presented as a working basis for defense planning in its broadest aspects.

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1. The most dangerous immediate (and possibly long-term) threat to US security lies in the sociological warfare which the USSR is waging through international Communism -- against the economic, political, and social structure of the non-Communist states of the world. This threat cannot be countered by military force in being or advanced bases; it will impose continuing heavy burdens, both domestic and international, upon US resources.

2. The highest probability from the viewpoint of the military threat is that the USSR does not intend to seek its objectives by military action involving the US in the near, and possibly in the indefinite future. A risk of military warfare, however, is inherent in the world situation.

3. In terms of traditional power concepts, US potential military strength rather than US military strength in being appears to deter the USSR from pursuing its objectives in the many areas of direct conflict between East and West by immediate military action.

4. The policy and actions of the US can have a determining effect upon the Soviet choice of instruments, -i.e., revolutionary methods or military force - for obtaining objectives.

5. In the light of the Marxist interpretation of historical development it should not be assumed that temporary stabilization in the non-Communist world, or parts of it, will necessarily mean that the USSR at that time will abandon its revolutionary methods and resort to military action.

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6. It is unlikely that Soviet leaders will lose confidence in the validity of the Marxist concept of historical development (the inevitable collapse of capitalist society through a long-term process of ebb and flow) until the non-Communist world has demonstrated over a considerable period of time that it can reverse the trends of the last 25 years and establish a stable and self-confident international society. Similarly they are unlikely to lose confidence in their revolutionary techniques and deliberately resort to military action against a stronger adversary unless in response to compelling power threats -- real or imagined -- from the non-Communist states.

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SOVIET INTENTIONS AND OBJECTIVES IN  
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It is time that we undertook a broad reappraisal of Soviet intentions and objectives, particularly in their relation to basic US security interests.

The war scare of last March had no tangible basis. It developed from a sudden focussing of attention on the preponderance of Soviet military force in being, viewed against the violence of Soviet propaganda and behavior and an interpretation of Soviet intentions solely in terms of traditional Western concepts of power relations. Military capabilities were immediately translated into intentions without due consideration of the wide variety of factors, other than the preponderance of military force in being, that enter into the decision of any nation to go to war. In particular, it failed to include an objective appraisal of the specific ideological foundations of the Soviet state.

Foundations of Soviet objectives and policy.

It is as unrealistic to appraise the objectives, policy, and methods of the Soviet state without reference to Marxist doctrine as it would be to appraise the objectives, policy, and methods of the US without reference to the principles of Liberal Democracy. Marxism -- a body of doctrine, interpretation, and practice -- has become one of the great ideological movements in history, sharing with other forces like Christianity, Islamism, and Democracy the power to mold the thoughts and actions of men. Marxism, therefore, should be recognized as an essential ingredient in the

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process by which Soviet leaders define their own objectives and estimate the objectives of the Western Powers. The Marxist interpretation of the behavior of capitalist states (the US and Western Europe) presents a world conditioned by imperialistic power politics. Thus the heads of the Soviet state pursue Marxian objectives in a world in which they expect capitalist states ultimately to use military force to achieve their imperialistic aims. Soviet intentions and objectives in international affairs, therefore, must be simultaneously appraised in terms of the revolutionary concepts of Marxism and the Soviet assumption that the Western Powers are pursuing traditional imperialistic power politics.

Stalin, in his writings and speeches for the guidance of Party members, interprets and applies Marxist doctrine in terms both of contemporary power relations and of the revolutionary role which the USSR must play in the fulfillment of the Marxist prediction that capitalist society will inevitably collapse. Stalin repeatedly emphasizes that Marxist doctrine is based upon laws of historical development that have the validity of scientific truth. Soviet policy is accordingly provided with (a) a rigid and doctrinaire interpretation of the essential character of the present world situation and of its future development, and (b) any aggressive device -- international Communism -- to aid in fulfilling this interpretation. Although many of the objectives of Soviet foreign policy, therefore, may appear to be identical with what were considered the traditional objectives of imperial Russia, the comprehensive Soviet objective is clearly to achieve a Communist world under Soviet leadership rather than to conquer the world by military force.

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Stalinist doctrine suggests clearly that the primary aggressive instrument of Soviet foreign policy is international Communism. Soviet military power is essentially an adjunct to this instrument -- defending the USSR in a world still dominated by imperialistic power politics or supporting the revolutionary process when the use of military power would not conflict with over-all Soviet policy or involve the USSR prematurely in military conflict with a stronger adversary.

Although it would be dangerous to accept Stalin's writings as an infallible guide to Soviet decisions, these writings clearly reveal the new elements of doctrine and tactics and the new instruments of national policy which the USSR has brought into international relations. They also throw light on the Soviet approach to the problem of balancing between the use of military force and revolutionary methods in pursuit of basic objectives. They must be given serious consideration in any attempt to predict Soviet behavior in terms of the world power conflict and in the determination of where US security interests really lie and what policies should be adopted to protect them .

Soviet policy and the risks of War.

The policy which the USSR adopted at the end of World War II was wholly consistent with Stalinist doctrine: the USSR initiated sociological warfare -- the "cold war" -- the objective of which is to undermine the economic, political and social structure of the non-Communist world. International Communism, supported by Soviet propaganda, has been the primary weapon. This sociological warfare, however, is being carried on

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in the context of a traditional power rivalry in a world in which power has become polarized. Soviet leaders are aware of both the value of their military force in being as an adjunct to their sociological warfare and the necessity for being prepared to join the issue on a power basis if forced to do so. In conducting the sociological war, therefore, they keep clearly in mind at the same time the strategic position of the USSR in relation to a possible armed conflict and view changes in the strategic position of their adversaries, particularly the US, in the same terms.

The presumption is very strong, however, that Soviet leaders intend and hope to pursue their broad objectives over the next few years -- and possibly indefinitely -- by sociological warfare rather than to resort to military action. There are many factors which support this presumption. In general terms the most important are: (1) the Stalinist concept of historical development and of the role therein of the USSR and international Communism; (2) the inferior power potential of the USSR in relation to that of the US and its probable allies; (3) the fact that the non-Communist world has not yet been stabilized around a US center of power but continues ripe for sociological warfare; (4) the failure of the USSR to resort to military action during the last three years when the preponderance of Soviet military strength in being was at its maximum.

(For a detailed discussion of the basis of this presumption, see Enclosure B)

However, the very existence of a state of sociological warfare and the proximity of the armed forces of the contestants in many areas of the

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world create a situation in which there is an ever-present risk of military conflict through incidents or miscalculation. There is also an additional element of risk in that we cannot be certain that the preponderance of Soviet military strength in being might not, under certain circumstances, tempt Soviet leaders to resort to military action.

(For a detailed discussion of the risks of military action, see Enclosure B.)

Implications for US defense requirements.

It is clear, therefore, that, in spite of a strong presumption that the USSR does not intend to resort to military action in the near, or indeterminate, future, an adequate military force in a state of readiness is essential to US security. It is equally clear from the foregoing that the adequacy of this force cannot be determined on the basis of military considerations alone, for the Soviet threat to US security in its world-wide implication is both sociological and military. The problem of military security, therefore, must be considered in relation to the over-all requirements and commitments of the US and its allies in a power conflict that has broad sociological as well as military implications.

The basic requirement of our defense on the sociological front is the maintenance of a sound economic and social structure in the US and the restoration of economic and social stability throughout the non-Communist world. The expenditures on military defense, therefore, must be considered in relation to their impact on the economic and social

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stability of the US and its allies. It is beyond the scope of this paper to define this problem in specific financial terms but the limits of the problem can be narrowed by reducing it to this question: what is the minimum we can safely spend on military defense and what is the maximum we can afford to spend on it, bearing in mind the need for economic and financial stability and the full implications of world-wide sociological warfare.

The problem must also be approached from another angle -- the determination of calculated risks based upon the most probable assumptions with regard to Soviet intentions, methods, and objectives. This may appear to be a dangerous procedure because of the element of uncertainty underlying any such assumptions. For planning purposes, however, it must be done since US resources are not unlimited and we must find some criteria for the most effective allocation of these resources in terms of an appreciation of US security interests in the broadest sense.

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Assumption for Defense Planning.

The following assumptions with regard to Soviet intentions, methods, and objectives are presented as a working basis for defense planning in its broadest aspects.

1. The most dangerous immediate (and possibly long-term) threat to the US lies in the sociological warfare which the USSR is waging -- through international Communism -- against the economic, political, and social structures of the non-Communist states of the world. The US has undertaken to meet this threat in part by the ECA and other programs for economic -- and where necessary, military -- aid throughout the world. In appraising the US position with respect to the sociological front and the possible future requirements for continuing operations on this front, four basic points must be borne in mind:

a. Military force in being and advanced military bases cannot counter the sociological threat, except to the extent of giving psychological support to public morale. An excessive concentration of the economic and financial resources of the US and its allies on military force in being will adversely affect the efforts which the US is now making or should make in the future on the sociological front.

b. The prospects that ERP will produce the originally estimated results by 1952 are highly uncertain. Therefore, what comes after ERP if these results are not achieved?

c. The Soviet sociological offensive must be viewed against the background of the basic economic and social problems of the non-Communist world today. Even before World War I, forces within the structure of

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capitalist society had initiated trends which have since increasingly affected the stability both of the internal structure of individual states and of the 19th century system of international economic and political relationships. World Wars I and II accelerated these trends, and their destructive effects have accumulated rapidly. International Communism, as a revolutionary force, had nothing to do with their initiation and little to do with their development. The present serious condition of unbalance in international economic relationships and in the economic and social structure of individual states, however, has created a situation in which, even if there were no Communist threat, the US would be faced with the basic problem of taking the leadership in an attempt to create a new world stability. The susceptibility of this situation to Communist exploitation and the aggressiveness and appeal of Communist ideology make it doubly imperative that a new world stability and self-confidence be established if the US and its allies are to succeed on the sociological front. What policies and commitments will this require of the US?

d. The US domestic program, as outlined in the President's State of the Union message, must likewise be considered as a factor in the broader sociological conflict to the extent that it makes demands upon the US defense dollar.

2. The highest probability, from the viewpoint of the military threat, is that the USSR does not intend to seek its objectives by military action involving the US in the near, and possibly in the indefinite, future. A risk of military warfare, however, is inherent in the world situation, entirely apart from any possible Soviet intentions.

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3. Soviet behavior since the war suggests, that, in terms of traditional power concepts, it is US potential military strength rather than US military force in being that deters the USSR from pursuing its objectives in the many areas of direct conflict between East and West by immediate military action.

4. The policy and actions of the US can have a determining effect upon the Soviet choice of instruments -- i.e., revolutionary methods or military force -- for attaining objectives. To the extent that the US may appear to be intending to fight the sociological war with military weapons, we increase the chances that the USSR will believe itself forced to meet us on these grounds. Soviet leaders are prepared to do so if necessary. They regard military force as a primary instrument of Western imperialism, and assume the possibility that the capitalist world might attack the USSR at any time and that it would inevitably do so in order to stave off its own collapse.

5. In the light of the Marxist interpretation of historical development with which Soviet leaders are thoroughly indoctrinated, it should not be assumed that temporary stabilization in the non-Communist world, or parts of it, will necessarily mean that the USSR at that time will abandon its revolutionary methods and resort to military action. Marxist doctrine describes the revolutionary process as taking place through cycles of ebb and flow. In the face of an impending stabilization, we must be prepared to see the USSR relax the tensions it seeks to create by sociological warfare, but we must not interpret this as a change in ultimate objectives.

(For a more complete discussion of this point, see Enclosure C.)

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6. In view of the serious economic and social problems facing the non-Communist world today and the Marxist concept of an ebb and flow in the historical process, it is unlikely that Soviet leaders will lose confidence in the validity of their concept of historical development until the non-Communist world has clearly demonstrated, over a considerable period of time, that it can reverse the trends of the last twenty-five years and establish a stable international society. Consequently, they are unlikely for some time to come similarly to lose confidence in their revolutionary techniques and deliberately resort to military action unless in response to compelling power threats - real or imagined - from the non-Communist states.

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There are many factors which suggest that Soviet leaders intend and hope during the next few years and possibly indefinitely, to seek their objectives through political methods rather than to resort to military action.

I. Factors based on Soviet behavior and the professed tactics and objectives of Marxism as developed by Stalin.

1. Political methods -- embracing propaganda, and subversion and sabotage carried out by Soviet-directed Communist parties -- are the primary instruments of Soviet expansion and the cheapest and safest methods which Soviet leaders can employ. They add up to sociological warfare, the aim of which is to undermine the social, economic and political structures of the non-Communist states and ultimately to create a Communist world dominated by the USSR. These methods have already produced substantial results since the war. While the prospects for immediate further successes along these lines in Western Europe may have diminished recently, they do not appear to have been by any means exhausted, and new opportunities are markedly developing in the Near and Far East.

2. Soviet leaders -- in accord with the Stalinist development of Marxist doctrine -- appear still to believe that the capitalist world will disintegrate through its own contradictions. They probably anticipate, therefore, that although ECA may lead to a temporary stabilization in Western Europe, the basic world economic dislocations accelerated by World War II will subsequently reassert themselves and lead ultimately to the fulfillment of the Marxist prediction. Under these circumstances the natural

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role of the USSR would be to lessen surface tensions while strengthening its capabilities for exploiting the favorable opportunities (the Marxist "revolutionary situations") when they reappear. Stalinist doctrine is flexible in its timetable. It envisages a determination of tactics in accord with an anticipated ebb and flow in the revolutionary movement.

It should be noted also that there are several factors which may suggest to Soviet leaders that even the temporary stabilization of Western Europe is by no means assured. These are: (a) the possibility of splits developing among the Western Powers over the issues of Germany, Western Union, etc., which would be substantially increased if De Gaulle should come to power in France; (b) the probability, as admitted in the recent report of the Organization of European Economic Cooperation, that unless the Western European states make further drastic adjustments in their economic programs, a substantial deficit vis-a-vis the dollar area will still exist at the conclusion of the ERP Program; and (c) the rapidly deteriorating situation in the Far East which not only provides an offsetting opportunity for extending Soviet influence in the face of a prospective stabilization of Western Europe but may at the same time tend to retard such stabilization through economic repercussions.

II. Factors relating to Soviet capabilities for military conflict with the US.

1. Soviet economic potential has not yet been sufficiently developed in terms of the requirements of a global war against the US. There are still serious deficiencies in transportation, communications and in the production of steel, oil, machine tools, etc. Nor will the USSR

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have the essentials for carrying the war to the US--a deep-sea navy, adequate shipping for amphibious operations and an adequate long-range air force.

2. The USSR presumably will not have the atomic bomb--at least in sufficient quantities within the next few years.

3. The occupation in the near future of Europe and the Near East--which for strategic reasons the USSR would almost certainly have to carry out with the outbreak of hostilities--would impose serious strains on the Soviet administration and expose Soviet leaders to grave risks.

a. The maintenance of military and police forces adequate to protect the defensive position gained by the occupation of most of Western Europe and the Near East would place a serious strain on both the economic resources and manpower reserve of the Soviet Union. Assuming that war with the US continues, following the conquest of Western Europe and the Near East, the hostile populations of these areas and of the Satellite States would form an enormous subversive element that would become particularly dangerous with the approach of US forces.

b. In addition to the problem of physical security, the control and assimilation of the economies of Western Europe and the exploitation of the resources of the Near East would impose a tremendous strain upon Soviet administrative organs and personnel resources, even though the help of well-organized local Communist parties would be available in some areas.

c. Soviet personnel would be exposed in large numbers to the standard of living and political ideas of Western Europe. Following World War II, the Soviet leaders have had a serious problem of reindoctrinating not only

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the returned soldiers but the entire Soviet population. The exigencies of war, entirely apart from the possibility of any alien contamination, appear to have undermined Communist ideology and discipline.

4. The Soviet population is definitely war-weary and has long been promised an improvement in its standard of living. While the Russians traditionally unite to repel foreign invaders, Soviet leaders might question whether under present circumstances they could risk a protracted global war which even their effective propaganda would have difficulty in selling as a war to defend "Mother Russia."

5. Politicians in the Politburo have always been suspicious of the military. War would again bring the military to the fore and might constitute a real or imagined threat to the party leaders.

III. Supplementary evidence suggesting that the USSR does not contemplate near-term military action.

1. The grandiose program of soil conservation and reforestation (if seriously carried out) would hardly have been undertaken if the USSR contemplated hostilities in the near future. The labor, materials, and money required for this project presumably would be expended on transportation, industrial or direct armament developments.

2. Soviet handling of the Tito split on the issue of national independence vis-a-vis the Cominform and of the problem of collectivization in the satellite states in the face of strong resistance, indicate that the Kremlin is willing to risk temporary weakness in these strategically important areas to obtain greater strength through firmer control in the future. If the Kremlin expected to resort to military hostilities in the near future it

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would hardly have handled these issues at this time in this manner.

3. Recent financial reforms appear to be designed for  
peacetime rather than wartime needs.

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The risks of war may be examined under the following general categories:

a. The existence of a state of sociological warfare--the "cold war"---and the close proximity of the armed forces of the contestants in many areas of the world create a situation in which there is an ever-present risk of military conflict through incidents or miscalculations.

b. In view of the preponderance of Soviet military force in being, we cannot be certain that the USSR might not, under certain circumstances, launch an aggressive or preventive war at a time of its own choosing.

Discussion of point a.

It is obvious that under prevailing conditions of international tensions, the close proximity of the armed forces of the principal contestants in various parts of the world might lead to armed clashes that could conceivably precipitate full-scale military operations. However, it is believed that incidents of this kind, although more apt to occur, are somewhat less likely to result in formal warfare than in the period prior to World War II. Statesmen are now conscious of the fateful implications of modern war on a global basis and consequently less likely than formerly to permit an unplanned incident to lead to open hostility. The shooting down of American aircraft by the Yugoslavs and recurring incidents between US and Soviet forces in Germany and Austria may be cited as cases in point. Nevertheless, there is always a risk. The danger is probably greater that war might develop out of miscalculations by the US or the USSR as to how far each could go without provoking the other into armed action.

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Discussion of point b. **TOP SECRET**

As indicated under Enclosure A above, it is believed that the highest probability attaches to the assumption that the USSR does not intend to resort to military action during the next few years. However, consideration must be given to a number of factors which with some logic can be advanced as possibly inducing the USSR to capitalize on its immediate preponderance of military capabilities to overrun Western Europe and the Middle East to Egypt. When considered against the broad background of the Soviet position, as defined both in terms of the Marxist interpretation of historical development and of imperialistic power politics, these factors, with one possible exception, appear to fall in the category of "remote possibilities." The most important of these factors may be enumerated as follows:

I. The strategic advantages to be derived from a quick and easy conquest of Western Europe and a large part of the Middle East which would give the USSR immediate control of the economic resources and technical skills of these areas, might be such as to induce Soviet leaders to undertake this operation.

The intelligence agencies have already made a careful study of this question on the assumption that the USSR would move prior to 1950. They have examined and weighed the military, political, economic and scientific effects upon the Soviet position. (The elements involved should remain essentially the same through 1952.) They have concluded that actually the disadvantages to the USSR would substantially outweigh the advantages, particularly in terms of the continuing global war with the US which such action would most probably provoke and that, therefore,

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Soviet leaders would be unlikely to exercise their current military capabilities for strategic considerations alone.\*

It may be objected that we have no assurance that Soviet leaders in analyzing this situation would come to the same conclusion. Two points may be advanced, however, which suggest that they may take a view similar to ours although on somewhat different grounds:

1. They have not exercised these capabilities during the past three years when the discrepancy between Soviet and Western military strength in being was probably at its maximum and when there were many points of conflict in which the USSR could have obtained its local objectives by the use of military force. This may be taken as a presumptive indication that it is the potential military power of the US rather than its military force in being that is the basic deterrent, from the point of view of pure power politics, to Soviet military action.

2. The employment of Soviet military force at this time would also be contrary to the Stalinist definition of the role of the USSR in helping to fulfill the Marxist interpretation of historical development. The postwar period has produced a classic "revolutionary situation" in which the primary Soviet aggressive instrument, international Communism, can work to hasten the breakdown of the capitalist world. As defined in Stalin's writings the primary function of Soviet military force is to defend the Soviet Union against possible--if not probable-- capitalist attack in a world still dominated by power politics. Its offensive role

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\*The Directorate of Air Intelligence dissented from this study.

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is secondary. It might be used to intervene, where it could be done without military risk or without conflicting with broader policy considerations---for example, in a clearly revolutionary situation in a neighboring state to assure success of a Communist attempt to seize power. (There was considerable fear last spring that this might occur in Italy.) Similarly, it could move into an adjacent vacuum where again no risk was involved. As long, however, as Soviet leaders remain convinced of the Marxist interpretation of historical development (acknowledging an ebb and flow in the process of capitalist deterioration), both the implications of the doctrine and "the logic of the situation" suggest that the USSR is unlikely voluntarily to precipitate a global military conflict with the US, particularly when the latter's military potential is greater than that of the USSR.

II. Prospective rearmament of the US and Western Europe might induce the USSR to employ its current preponderance of military strength before these rearmament programs could be accomplished.

The arguments outlined in (I) above and in the discussions in Enclosure A may likewise be advanced against such a decision.

III. Soviet leaders may estimate that the ECA Program will succeed in stabilizing Western Europe indefinitely. They might decide on this basis that they had better take Western Europe and the oil resources of the Middle East while the opportunity exists.

This argument once again ignores the basic concept of historical development which underlies Soviet thinking. Periodic stabilizations of the capitalist world are definitely a part of this concept. The USSR

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would naturally use the resources of international Communism to the maximum, as it has done, in an effort to prevent such stabilization and to make it as costly as possible to the capitalist powers. There is nothing to suggest, however, that the successful stabilization of Western Europe would undermine Soviet confidence in the Marxist concept of historical development or in the ultimate effectiveness of its revolutionary procedures. Such specific indications as we have noted in III of Enclosure A tend to support the contention that either the USSR does not anticipate that the stabilization of Western Europe will be accomplished or that its prospective accomplishment has not yet induced Soviet leaders to consider a change from revolutionary to military action. Finally, there are the basic considerations that, even if stabilization should occur in Western Europe, vast opportunities for the expansion of Soviet influence are developing in the Near and Far East and that the USSR is not yet adequately prepared for a global war with the US.

IV. The prospect of stabilization in Western Europe might undermine the confidence of Soviet leaders in the validity of the Marxist interpretation of historical development and lead them to embark on a baldly imperialist course of military expansion.

We see little likelihood that this development will take place for a considerable time in the future. The Marxist concept embraces a long-term view of this historical development. No time factor is involved and an ebb and flow is a normal expectancy. In view of the magnitude of the basic economic, political and social problems facing the non-Communist world at the present time, there would appear to be little likelihood that Soviet leaders will lose confidence in the validity of the Marxist concept of

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historical development, at least until the non-Communist world has clearly demonstrated over a considerable period of time that it can reverse the trends of the last twenty-five years and establish a stable society. Even should Soviet leaders loose their faith in the Marxist interpretation, the basic relative power potential as between the US and the USSR remains as outlined in the points above. Under these circumstances Soviet leaders might well prefer to build up over a period of years the large underdeveloped economic potential of the USSR before risking military conflict with the US.

V. Soviet leaders might become convinced that the US and its Western allies intended to attack the USSR as soon as their rearmament programs were complete.

This would appear to be the most compelling reason that might induce the USSR deliberately to resort to military action in the near future. The points outlined under III of Enclosure A, however, suggest that Soviet leaders do not presently consider that such an attack is imminent, in spite of their basic belief that capitalist nations inevitably resort to war to attain their imperialistic objectives. They must be aware of the strong deterrents at the present time, both psychological and constitutional, to the launching of an aggressive or preventive war by the US. In this respect, however, the future policy and actions of the US could have an important bearing on Soviet intentions.

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ENCLOSURE C

At the end of hostilities the USSR had the opportunity of collaborating with the West but chose instead to launch the "cold war". In making this decision Soviet leaders undoubtedly knew that they were committing themselves to a greatly retarded rate of economic development in the USSR and the Satellite States. To many Westerners the Soviet decision appeared extremely stupid inasmuch as the US was then ready to contribute substantially to the recovery and economic expansion of the USSR. The Soviet decision, however, was wholly consistent with Stalinist doctrine. It reflected the application of the basic Stalinist concept that the USSR must exploit to the maximum the revolutionary situations that inevitably follow a great war. Soviet policy during the last three years suggests clearly that the USSR has been pursuing this objective relentlessly to the detriment of its internal economic development.

It is quite possible, therefore, that if Soviet leaders become convinced that they have obtained the maximum gains possible in Europe through the "cold war" -- that is, that the postwar revolutionary situation has begun to stabilize -- and if, at the same time, they recognize that their policy of non-cooperation is causing serious economic difficulties in the USSR and the Satellite States they may seek a temporary détente in the hope of increasing the tempo of their economic progress. There are, in fact, many indications of serious economic difficulties in the Satellite States. These are reflected, in part at least, in the increasing efforts

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of the USSR and its Satellites to get machinery and various types of capital equipment from the West by covert means and an increasing interest in East-West trade.

If the USSR should seek such a détente, we must assume that it is merely a tactical maneuver. While the Cominform and local Communist Parties throughout the world might modify their aggressive tactics somewhat, they could be expected to continue their activities in preparation for exploiting the next flow of the revolutionary tide whenever and wherever it appeared. There could hardly be a change in Soviet long-range objectives without a change in Soviet leadership and a repudiation of many of the tenets of Marxism as developed by Stalin.

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